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The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis
of the Applicability of the Laws of War
Governing Non-International Armed
Conflicts in the Modern World
I. Introduction
A civil war is defined as "a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country."1 This type of warfare is rooted in the
very origins of humanity and can be traced back to the dawn of or-
ganized states. A civil war is set in a different context than other
wars. It is an internal conflict pitting "brother against brother." As
such, it is often much more intense and costly than any form of war-
fare. Such internal armed conflicts, unlike those that cross political
as well as geographic boundaries, frequently have been overlooked in
the laws of war. It is only recently that the laws of war have been
considered in the context of civil war.
Such a civil war has ripped apart what was once a unified six
republic nation of Yugoslavia into five separate entities.' These are
the independent countries that have succeeded from Yugoslavia:
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the remains of the
Yugoslav state, consisting of the republics of Serbia and Montene-
gro, as well as the secessionist republic of Macedonia which has also
succeeded, but has not been recognized by outside nations.' The con-
sequence of this turmoil has been a stream of blood flowing along the
various ethnic divisions within each republic. The civil war has re-
sulted in at least 10,000 deaths with ever shifting areas of conflict
and violence.4 This Comment will analyze the existing laws of war
and their applicability to a civil war situation with a focus on Croa-
tia, Slovenia,'and Serbia.
In an attempt to understand the roots of today's problems, Part
II of this Comment discusses the history of Slovenia, Croatia, and
Serbia and the origins of conflict within these provinces. Next, Part
1. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 244 (9th ed. 1986).
2. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1992, at 10, col. 4
3. Id. This Comment will focus solely on the crisis between Croatia, Slovenia, and Ser-
bia. At the time of publication the Yugoslavian civil war was entering into a second phase of
warfare between the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This Comment does not
address this rapidly developing aspect of the crisis.
4. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1992, at 6, col. 6.
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III examines the immediate sources of the crisis and the resulting
Yugoslavian civil war. Parts IV and V then describe the two gener-
ally recognized situations in which the laws of war apply to an inter-
nal conflict and their relation to the current Yugoslavian civil war,
focusing on the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia. Finally,
Part VI offers concluding remarks on the current situation.
II. History and Background
A. Origins of the Ethnic Divisions within Yugoslavia
An analysis of the present Yugoslavian crisis must begin with
an understanding of the heterogeneity of the nation's population.5
Yugoslavia has a population of approximately 23 million inhabitants,
consisting of several distinct ethnic groups.' The two largest groups
are the Serbs (9.3 million) and the Croats (4.6 million).' Other sig-
nificant groups include 4.1 million Bosnians and Hercegovinans, 1.9
million Macedonians, 1.8 million Slovenes, and 590,000
Montenegrins. 8 No single ethnic group has an absolute majority in
Yugoslavia.9 As a result, Yugoslavia is neither a homogeneous na-
tion-state nor a multinational country, but rather the political union
of several South Slav or Yugoslav ethnic groups.10 Such ethnic diver-
sity has often resulted in tensions that have recently exploded into
war. The aspect of the Yugoslavian civil war examined in this Com-
ment primarily involves the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes.
I. Serbia.-The Serbians arrived in the Balkan area in the
seventh century A.D." For five centuries after their arrival, the
Serbs struggled both with internal clans and foreign influences,
which led to a lack of cohesion. 12 Under the Nemanjid dynasty, how-
ever, a strong Serbian state was established that reached its zenith in
5. B. MCFARLANE. YUGOSLAVIA POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 2 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id. The Serbs comprised 40% of the population in 1921, 36% in 1981, and 41.5%
in 1988. The Croats comprised 24% of the population in 1921, 20% in 1981, and 20.1% in
1988. B. MCFARLANE, supra note 2, at xviii; S. PAVLOWITCH, THE IMPROBABLE SURVIVOR
YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS PROBLEMS 1918-1988 64-65 (1988).
8. B. MCFARLANE, supra note 5, at 2. There are also ten national minorities which
include the following: Siptars (1.7 million), Hungarians (470,000), Turks (120,000), Slovaks
(83,000), Romanians (58,000) and gypsies (70,485). Id.
9. Together the Serbs and Croats comprised 64% of the population in 1921, 56% in
1981, and 61.6% in 1988. B. MCFARLANE, supra note 5, at 2; S. PAVLOWITCH, supra note 4,
at 64.
10. S. PAVLOWITCH, supra note 7, at 64.
II. H. DARBY. A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1966 87
(1966). The Slavs first appeared in the Balkans as raiders of Roman settlements in the fourth
century A.D. and participated as one of the many groups who plundered the Roman Empire.
F. SINGELTON. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES 25 (1985).
12. H. DARBY, supra note II, at 87. At times these clans headed by a zupan would unite
under a grand zupan but such unions would collapse followed by a period of disruption. The
entire era was characterized by confusion and turmoil. Id. at 89.
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the fourteenth century under Stephen Dusan. 13 Following Dusan's
death, the Serbian state collapsed under the Turkish invasions, and
Serbia remained under the Turkish influence until the mid-nine-
teenth century." A combination of factors, including Serbians' rally-
ing to form a united front against the Turks and the growth of West-
ern influence in the region, culminated in the eventual expulsion of
the Turks and the recognition of Serbia as a state at the Berlin Con-
gress in 1878.15
As a result of this historical turmoil and development, Serbia
has acquired strong national sentiment and political self-conscious-
ness. 6 In addition, the Serbians retained the use of the Cyrillic al-
phabet and chose to follow the Eastern Orthodox religion.17
2. Croatia.-The Croats arrived in their present homeland in
the seventh century and their early history is relatively obscure." A
Croatian kingdom flourished during the tenth and eleventh centuries,
but it eventually came under the control of Hungary and later under
Austria-Hungary control-a relationship that was to last for the
next eight hundred years until 1918.19 Despite the connection with
Hungary, the Croats viewed themselves as a separate state, merely
maintaining a common ruler.2 0 Naturally, the Croatian status often
fluctuated during this time, while Croatia varied from sovereign
state to vassal state.2 Similar to the Serbs, the Croats also exper-
ienced a national revival in the eighteenth century that affected the
later unification movement of the Slavs. 2 However, unlike the Serbs,
the Croats used the Latin alphabet and adhered to the Roman Cath-
olic religion.2
3. Slovenia.-The Slovenes first appeared in their modern re-
13. Id. at 96-99. Dusan is known as the Law-giver because of his introduction of the
legal code from 1349 to 1354 which essentially was a combination of Byzantine law and Ser-
bian customs. F. SINGELTON, supra note 11, at 25.
14. H. DARBY, supra note II, at 99-102.
15. F. SINGELTON, supra note I, at 72-97.
16. H. DARBY, supra note 1I, at 118-19. Many of these strong national feelings devel-
oped during the struggle against Turkish rule and became stronger as the nineteenth century
progressed. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 23.
19. F. SINGELTON, supra note I1, at 28-29; B. McFARLANE, supra note 2, at 3.
20. F SINGELTON supra note 11, at 29.
21. Id. The Croatian borders also fluctuated at times. Sections in the north and sections
of Bosnia were detached, while at other times, various areas came under brief Turkish control.
Id.
22. H. DARBY, supra note 1I, at 32-35. Much of this national awakening can be contrib-
uted to Napoleon's creation of the Illyrian Provinces which found the Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes in the same political unit. Although it lasted only four years, it contributed greatly to
the development of a Yugoslav consciousness later in the nineteenth century. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 11.
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gions in the sixth century. 4 The Slovenes came under the Holy Ro-
man Empire's general influence and later developed under a particu-
larly Austrian influence.2 5 The Slovenes experienced a national
awakening because Slovenia enjoyed favorable economic conditions
and the Slovene group was small and scattered. Nevertheless, this
awakening never reached the level achieved by the other Slav peo-
ple.2" The Slovenes did, however, play a part in the growing move-
ment towards a unified state.
B. The First World War and the Emergence of Yugoslavia
Prior to the First World War, it was evident that a slowly evolv-
ing movement was commencing with the ultimate goal of unification
of the Southern Slavs." The development of the Serbian state and
its success in the Second Balkan War, fueled the hopes of those
Slavs still under foreign, particularly Austria-Hungarian, domina-
tion .2  However, the vast differences in each ethnic group's historical
background presented many obstacles to a unified Southern Slav na-
tion.2 9 A cataclysmic change appeared to be necessary to affect the
expulsion of the Austria-Hungarian influence and to provide a foun-
dation upon which to establish a unified Southern Slav state.3 0 Thus,
the First World War would become the needed catalyst that created
the first modern Yugoslav state.
Prior to the war, Austria-Hungary was becoming increasingly
concerned over the rise of Serbia in the Balkan area and the increas-
ing rapprochement of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene ethnic groups. 31
In an effort to resolve the Eastern Question, Austria-Hungary had
repeatedly attempted and failed to provoke a war with Serbia.12 Fi-
nally, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an ap-
propriate spark was found to start the fire; Austria-Hungary de-
clared war on Serbia, thus, touching off the First World War.
3
1
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 13-19.
26. Id. at 21-22.
27. Id. at 154.
28. F. SINGELTON, supra note 11, at 114. Serbia had acquired Macedonia, Kosovo,
Metohija, and a part of the sandzak of Novi Pazar which resulted in a near doubling of Ser-
bian territory and an increase in population from 2.9 million to 4.4 million. Id. However, in the
process, Serbia's resources had been stretched to the limit, and any hope of liberation from the
Austrian-Hungarian yoke of the remaining Southern Slavs had become unrealistic. Id.
29. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 154-55.
30. Id. at 157.
31. Id. at 159.
32. F. SINGELTON, supra note 1I, at 114. Austria-Hungary had attempted to provoke a
war with Serbia over the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908; however, Serbia had
made diplomatic concessions which removed any reason for military action. Id.
33. Id. at 114-18. It is often suggested that the Austrian militarists contributed to the
circumstances that led to the assassination of the heir to the Harsburg throne'by failing to
provide adequate security arrangements. Id. at 115. Ferdinand was assassinated by Gavrilo
Princip, a conspirator from an organization known as the Black Hand. Id. at 117. The Black
[Vol. 10:2
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Despite a valiant struggle, the Serbians were eventually over-
whelmed by a combination of Austrian, German, and Bulgarian
forces, therefore, they retreated across Albania to the Adriatic
coast.34
By 1916 all the lands that were to comprise the Southern Slav
state remained under foreign occupation.3 5 With the Declaration of
Corfu on July 20, 1917, however, the two main groups of Southern
Slavs in exile-the Serbian exiles and the Yugoslav commit-
tee-agreed to a union of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a single
nation upon the termination of foreign occupation. 36 Thus, the seeds
of the first modern Yugoslav state were established. Accompanying
these seeds was a divergence of goals that resurfaced throughout the
history of Yugoslavia, and it is currently a dominant factor in the
present crisis. While the Yugoslav committee saw an equal partner-
ship between Serbs and Croats in a Southern Slav state, the Serbian
exiles viewed the new state as an enlarged Serbia. 37 Following the
defeat of the Central powers in the First World War, the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was officially announced on December
1, 1918.38
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was
renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, initially established a parliamentary
democracy.3 9 However, this governmental form failed and was fol-
lowed by a royal dictatorship. 0 This in turn was succeeded by a
mock parliamentary system that was swept aside by the Axis inva-
sion in April 1941."'
C. Yugoslavia and the Second World War
The leaders of the early Yugoslav state attempted to establish a
common political and economic order among a heterogeneous mix-
ture of various ethnic groups.4 2 The differences among the Southern
Slav people which had evolved throughout the centuries under dis-
tinct historical backgrounds, were generally ignored. The founding
fathers assumed that "a Yugoslav nation already existed, with a
Hand was founded by a group of Serbian army officers with the goal of working with Serbs
under the Austrian and Turkish empires for the achievement of a Greater Serbia founded on a
military expansion policy. Id. at 116.
34. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 159.
35. F. SINGLETON, supra note I1, at 124. The Bulgarians controlled Macedonia, mean-
while Montenegro had surrendered, and Bosnia-Hercegovina was under Austrian control. Id.
36. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 162.
37. F. SINGLETON, supra note 11, at 125-27.
38. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 164.
39. B. MCFARLANE, supra note 5, at 4-6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. F. SINGELTON, supra note 11, at 134.
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common language and a common sense of community.14 3 This as-
sumption was certainly erroneous, and presented another problem
that would manifest itself in the future in a significant fashion.
The Second World War not only compounded these existing
problems, but also contributed to the ethnic rift that existed between
the various groups, particularly the Serbs and Croats. On the morn-
ing of April 6, 1941, the Second World War began for Yugoslavia
when Hitler's armies commenced an invasion."" Just eleven days
later, Yugoslavia capitulated and a rapid partition was undertaken. "5
The Independent State of Croatia was created, and it immediately
undertook a campaign of purification aimed at removing the Serbs
from the new state.4 The result was a series of appalling atrocities
committed by a group known as Ustasa, in the areas of Croatia
where the Serbs were concentrated.47
In response to the German invasion and the subsequent atroci-
ties, two separate partisan groups arose. One of these was the
Chetniks under the leadership of Mihailovic. 48 The Chetniks favored
the Yugoslav monarchy and a Greater Serbia.49 In addition, until
the war turned against the Axis, the Chetniks sought to avoid armed
resistance since it consistently resulted in severe German reprisals. 50
The second group was a Communist-partisan organization
under the command of Tito.5 With the ultimate goal of a unified
socialist Yugoslavia, the communist partisans carried out a program
based on sabotage and isolated attacks. 52 The two groups could not
agree upon a common program; this eventually culminated in open
43. Id.
44. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 208. The attack coincided with the signing of a Treaty
of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. F. SINGELTON,
supra note 10, at 173. Yugoslavia had hoped the treaty would serve as a warning to the Axis
that Yugoslavia would not be alone if Italy moved into the Balkans. Id.
45. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 209. The Yugoslavian collapse was aided by a strategic
plan which attempted to defend the entire country rather than concentrating in the mountain-
ous core. Id. at 208. Furthermore, the Yugoslavian General Staff had expected the attack from
the north but the major German thrust in reality came from western Bulgaria. Id.
46. F. SINGELTON, supra note 11, at 175-77. The Independent State of Croatia
(Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska or NDH) was neither independent nor entirely Croatian. Id. at
177. The NDH was not recognized internationally; its government could act only with the
consent of the occupying powers, and its economy was subordinated to the German war ma-
chine. Id.
47. Id. at 177. While the exact number of Serbs killed in the NDH is unknown, Serbia
estimates 750,000, but Germany claims 350,000. Id. This extermination process was later
judged as genocide at the Nuremburg trials. Id.
48. Id. at 189.
49. Id. at 189. The cetnik which literally means an armed band, came to have a special
meaning as a band that fought against the Turks during the Ottoman occupation. Id. The
group developed in the nineteenth century as a Serbian volunteer force that specialized in
irregular warfare behind enemy lines. id.
50. id. at 189.
51. H. DARBY, supra note 11, at 212.
52. F. SINGELTON, supra note 11, at 193-95.
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hostilities between the two parties. 53
Thus, throughout the Second World War, several wars raged
within Yugoslavia: a war against the Germans, a war against Croat
Ustasa, and a war between the Chetniks and Communist partisans.
5 4
The cost of these wars was staggering. In addition to the tremendous
economic damage that paralyzed Yugoslavia for years to come,
1,700,000 people were killed. 5
D. Yugoslavia During and After Tito
Out of the ashes of the Second World War, there emerged the
Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia under the leadership of
Tito.56 Initially, Tito was aligned with the Soviet Union.57 However,
in 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform.58 The expul-
sion was caused by ideological as well as policy disagreements be-
tween the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which had increasingly been
developing independent of the other Member States. 59 Under Tito,
Yugoslavia made great social, economical, cultural, and political
strides.6 0 Tito himself provided a great force towards unity. Under
his guidance, this Yugoslav state had survived longer than any previ-
ous unified Southern Slav state.
In 1980 President Tito died and was replaced by a collective
leadership." Immediately, questions concerning the durability of
Yugoslavia's statehood began to emerge. Unfortunately, today the
answer seems to have surfaced in the form of civil war, as the dream
of unity appears to have succumbed to the ghosts of the past.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Id. at 193-201.
55. Id. at 206. The extent of Yugoslav wartime losses can be seen through the following
numbers:
Dead 1,700,000 (11 % of pre-war population)
Average Age 22 years
Homeless 3,500,000
Buildings 822,000 destroyed
Farm Equipment 80% destroyed
Railway Lines 50% destroyed
Locomotives 77% destroyed
Good Wagons 84% destroyed
F. SINGELTON, supra note I1, at 206. (citing D. RUSINow. THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT,
1948-1974 18 (1977)).
56. F. SINGLETON, supra note II, at 209.
57. Id. at 219-20.
58. Id. The Cominform was an association of countries which exchanged information
and established a machinery of consultation among the member states. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally S. BURG. CONFLICT AND COHESION IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, POLIT-
ICAL DECISION MAKING SINCE 1966 (1983) (A history of Yugoslavia under Tito and social-
ism); A DJII AS. THE CONTESTED COUNTRY. YUGOSLAV UNITY AND COMMUNIST REVOLUTION
1919-1953 (1991) (The Communist policies did not solve Yugoslavia's unity problems).
61. F. SINGELTON, supra note II, at 271.
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III. The Yugoslavian Crisis: Succession and Civil War
A. Immediate Origin of the Crisis
The origins of the present crisis in Yugoslavia developed during
the spring and summer of 1990 when Slovenia and Croatia voted in
free elections to install Western-style governments.62 By contrast,
Serbia chose to retain its Communist government under President
Slobodan Milosevic.6 3 This was followed by an independence referen-
dum in Slovenia that resulted in more than 80% of Slovenia's 2.1
million people favoring a secession from Yugoslavia.6" This landslide
was a clear indication of foreboding trouble. A main source of this
trouble was economic disparity; Croatia and Slovenia are both rela-
tively prosperous and have grown tired of subsidizing the poorer
southern republics such as Serbia. 5
The growing problems came to a head in May 1991, when the
leadership of the country's rotating presidency was due to change.66
Stipe Mesic, a Croat, was to assume the leadership of the country's
presidency.67 However, Serbia and several of its allies refused to ap-
prove Mesic. 8 This prompted a major crisis. Serbia wanted to pre-
serve its power over the federal institutions and felt that Mesic
would undermine this objective by contributing to the growing seces-
sion movements.6 9 This conflict constituted a major rift between the
parties because Milosevic and Serbia desire a strengthening of the
Yugoslav republic, while Croatia and Slovenia desire a more loosely
bound federation.70
B. Succession and Civil War
On June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence,
despite the fact that initially the Western European governments re-
fused to recognize them as states.7" Shortly thereafter, fierce fighting
broke out between the Yugoslav Army and the Slovenian national
62. Birnbaum, Yugoslavia; Breaking Up Is Hard, TIME, Feb. 25, 1991, at 56.
63. Id.
64. Borrell, Yugoslavia; Saying Yes to Independence, TIME, Jan. 7, 1991, at 62.
65. Smolowe, Yugoslavia; Blood in the Streets, TIME, July 8, 1991, at 38. Croatia earns
90% of Yugoslavia's tourism revenues. Birnbaum, supra note 55. Although Slovenia accounts
for only 9% of Yugoslavia's population, it manufactures more than 30% of its exports to the
West. Id. at 56. On the other hand, Serbia has been crippled by a drop of 35% in the repub-
lic's industrial production. Yugoslavia; Mass Bedlam in Belgrade, TIME, March 25, 1991, at
34.
66. Graff, Yugoslavia; Dangerous Muddle, TIME, May 27, 1991, at 37. Yugoslavia's





70. Yugoslavia; Humpty Dumpty, TIME, April I, 1991, at 50.
71. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
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guard.72 However, on July 8, 1991, a European Community media-
tion negotiated an agreement to prevent further fighting within Slo-
venia.73 Essentially, the agreement affected a cease-fire, withdrawal
of the Yugoslav army, and suspension of claims for independence by
Slovenia for several months.74 The agreement appears to have been
successful as hostilities have ceased. In addition, evidence from Ser-
bia, combined with several other additional factors, indicate it may
only be a matter of time until Slovenia gains its independence.7 5
First, Slovenia is ethnically homogeneous. 76 Second, Slovenia does
not border Serbia, rather it only shares a common border with Croa-
tia.77 Finally, Slovenia is most likely capable of economic success
and self-sufficiency.78 Thus, it appears Serbia has acceded the loss of
Slovenia.
Unfortunately, the situation in Croatia has progressed differ-
ently and much more violently. This is principally due to two inter-
woven factors that have resulted in a civil war instead of a peaceful
settlement. First, Croatia does not enjoy a homogeneous population.
Serbs constitute approximately 12 % or 600,000 of Croatia's 4.7 mil-
lion population.7'9 This Serb minority has created problems through-
out history, and the current crisis is no exception. Second, the Yugo-
slav Army is dominated by Serb officers schooled in hard-line
Communism.8" Although the Yugoslav Army is supposed to be
under the command of collective president Stipe Mesic, it appears to
have ceased taking orders and to have openly sided with the Serbs.8"
The army's new found leadership is vested in General Blogoje
Adniz, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and an ethnic Serb.82
The conscript ranks, however, are drawn in equal proportions from
the six republics.83 The result is a highly volatile and unpredictable
army whose next move is uncertain, and if faced with combat, may
fracture according to ethnic lines. These factors have combined to
result in open conflict between the ethnic Serb minority within Croa-
tia, the Yugoslav Army,.and the Croatian security forces. 84
Following Croatia's succession, hostilities which began with eth-
nic skirmishes gradually increased; the situation escalated into a civil
72. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
73. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
74. Id.




79. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1, col. 2.
80. Masland, supra note 75, at 28.
81. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
82. Id.
83. Masland, supra note 75, at 28.
84. Walsh, Yugoslavia; A Flash of War, TiME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 38-40.
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war. The civil war is composed of several aspects. First, Croatian
forces have blockaded approximately forty garrisons of the Yugoslav
army in the Croatian republic. 85 Second, with the goal of liberating
these garrisons and possibly ending Croatian independence, the Yu-
goslav Army has launched repeated offenses on air, land, and sea.88
Third, Serb rebels, with the support of the Yugoslav army, have es-
sentially carved out ethnic boundaries by gaining control of over one-
third of Croatia.87
An end to the fighting, however, may finally be near. On Janu-
ary 2, 1992, a fifteenth cease-fire was agreed to by Croatia and Ser-
bia.88 Under the plan the Yugoslav army troops in Croatia would be
replaced by a 14,000 member United Nations peacekeeping force to
monitor the cease-fire.8 9 However, this plan has met with stiff oppo-
sition because the Serb minority within Croatia, fears that it will be
at the mercy of the Croatian majority following removal of the Yu-
goslav army troops and later the United Nations peacekeeping
force. 90 The United Nations plan was further complicated when the
republic of Bosnia and Herzegovnia voted in favor of independence
in late February.91 The Serbs account for 31 % of Bosnia and
Herzegovnia's 4.3 million population, but claim to control 60% of its
territory. 2 As a consequence of the independence referendum, the
Serbs commenced attack designed to capture territory and dissuade
the European Community and the United States for recognizing
Bosnia and Herzegovnia." However, on April 6, 1992, the twelve-
nation European Community recognized the independence of Bosnia
and Herzegovnia.94 On April 7, 1992, the United States recognized
the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovnia, Croatia, and Slove-
nia. 95 Following recognition, the Serbian and Yugoslav Army forces
have increased the attacks and appear to be on the offensive. 96
Thus, the United Nations plan, designed for peacekeeping not
peacemaking, has been jeopardized as the previous peaceful republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovnia has moved closer toward civil war with
casualties beginning to mount.97 Nevertheless, as of mid-April 1992,
85. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at 5, col. 2.
86. Walsh, supra note 84, at 38-39.
87. Smolowe, Yugoslavia; The Case of Confederation, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 39.
88. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1992, at 10, col. 1.
89. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1992, at 3, col. 4.
90. Id. The Serbs presently living in Croatia have declared their own republic called
Krajina. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1992, at 3, col. 4.
91. N.Y. Times, March 3, 1992, at 9, col. 2.
92. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1992, at 3, col. 3.
93. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1992, at 3, col. 2.
94. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1992, at 3, col. 4.
95. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1992, at 10, col. 3.
96. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1992, at 6, col. 3.
97. N.Y. Times, April II, 1992, at 1, col. 6.
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several thousand soldiers of the United Nations peacekeeping force
have been sent to the front lines of Croatia.98 Thus, although a
cease-fire is presently in effect, there is no guarantee that it will fi-
nally end the crisis considering the rapidly developing violence in
Bosnia and Herzegovnia and the failure of fourteen previous cease-
fire agreements.99 The crisis will only end when Croatia and Serbia
are ready to put an end to the bloodshed which has already resulted
in over 10,000 deaths.
100
With respect to Yugoslavia, it is necessary to first examine the
two situations in which the laws of war apply to non-international
armed conflicts. Second, the applicability of these laws of war must
be considered in light of the current internal conflict in Yugoslavia.
IV. The Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed
Conflicts
A. Definition of the Non-International Conflict
"The internal armed conflict is a means of expression, a deadly
dialogue when none other is any longer possible." 101 Such a defini-
tion appears to adeptly describe the situation in Yugoslavia. In 1962,
this definition was expanded by a Committee of experts who met in
Geneva to discuss internal conflicts.102 The Committee explained
that an armed conflict exists "if hostile action against a lawful Gov-
ernment assumes a collective character and a minimum of organiza-
tion."1 ' 3 A series of factors were enunciated to access a conflict: du-
ration of the conflict; number and leadership of rebel groups;
installations or actions in parts of the territory; degree of insecurity;
existence of victims; and means adopted by the lawful government
re-establish order.' These factors for assessing a conflict should be
rather broadly considered.'05
Applying the above factors to the Yugoslavian situation reveals
a non-international conflict. The Yugoslavian crisis has continued for
a prolonged duration entangling nearly the entire country in terms of
population and territory. In the course of this warfare, there have
98. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1992, at 6, col. 5.
99. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 10, col. 4.
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1, col. 2. According to European Community offi-
cials, about 6,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed on the Croatian side. Id. Serbian
officials report approximately 4,000 military casualties. Id. The Central Office of Statistics in
Croatia estimates that up to 40% of its factories have been destroyed or damages, with 18.7
billion dollars to rebuild. Id.
101. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 99 (1969).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 100.
105. Id. at 100.
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been thousands of casualties resulting from the government's at-
tempts to re-establish order. With a strong degree of organization,
the hostile action of succession by Croatia and Slovenia has clearly
reached a collective character. At the very minimum, it can be cor-
rectly called a non-international armed conflict; consequently, the
laws of war governing a non-international conflict must be examined.
B. Common Article Three of the 1949 Geneva Convention
The laws of war are defined as a "a branch of public interna-
tional law, and comprises the body of rules and principles observed
by civilized nations for the regulation of matters inherent in, or inci-
dental to, the conduct of public war." 106 These laws regulate aspects
of war such "as the relation of neutrals and belligerents, blockades,
captures, prizes, truces and armistices, capitulations, prisoners, and
declarations of war and peace."' 10 7 The laws of war rest upon the
ability and willingness of each side in a armed conflict to accentuate
between combatants and civilians and between military and nonmili-
tary targets. 108 However, civil wars are fundamentally different from
other types of conflicts. "Internal conflicts have become chambers of
horror. Destruction, brutality, and death do not after all, recognize
international boundaries; they stalk their prey wherever men fight
one another."'1 9 As a consequence, the humanitarian objectives of
the laws of war are often disregarded in the pursuit of total victory.
Thus, it has been only recently that attempts have been made to
establish laws of war governing civil war.
For several hundred years, it has been suggested that the laws
concerning warfare applied equally to parties involved in civil war. 110
In 1912 at an International Conference of the Red Cross, a motion
was made to deal with civil wars, but it was largely unheeded."' It
was not until 1949, following fundamental revisions in the Geneva
Conventions that internal conflicts were finally and officially ad-
dressed." 2 The result was Common Article 3 (Article) which was
106. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1419 (5th ed. 1979).
107. Id. at 1419-1420.
108. R. FAULK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 8 (1971). [hereinafter INTER-
NATIONAL] See also J. KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 831-923 (1968).
109. J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT. INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF WAR 45
(1974). Examples abound: In Algeria French soldiers killed over 100,000 rebels and suffered
the loss of 13,000 soldiers between 1954 and 1960; furthermore, in the Nigerian civil war,
approximately 2,000,000 Biafrans died. Id.
110. H. TAUBENFELD, THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAWS OF WAR IN CIVIL WAR 503 (J.
Moore ed. 1974).
Ill. Id. The motion would have permitted aid in the care and nursing of the sick and
wounded and of noncombatants with "utmost impartiality as between the members of the
opposing factors." Id. at 502-03. See also Schlogel, Civil War, 108 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
123, 124-25 (1970).
112. H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 110, at 503. At the Geneva Diplomatic Conference in
1949 intense arguments occurred over the addition of any form of provision relating to internal
[Vol. 10:2
Winter 19921 YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WAR
adopted by each of the four Geneva Conventions. 113 Generally, Arti-
cle 3 applies to an armed conflict not of international character and
requires that each party shall abide by certain minimum fundamen-
tal humanitarian provisions."' Moreover, Article 3 provides that
there shall be no discrimination against members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms or who have been hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause." 5 Finally, applica-
tion of the provisions shall not affect the legal status of the parties to
the conflict."' 6
Although Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions repre-
sents an advancement in the laws governing an internal conflict, ex-
perience has quickly demonstrated its inadequacy. 1 7 Initially, there
wars. Id.
113. Id. at 504. The Four Conventions are the following: "(1) wounded and sick in
armed forces in the field; (II) wounded, sick and ship-wrecked in armed forces at sea; (IlI)
prisoners of war; and (IV) civilians." DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 169 (A. Roberts and
R. Guelff eds., 2nd ed. 1989) [hereinafter Roberts]. The Four Conventions are linked by com-
mon articles which are the general provisions beginning each Convention; the provisions relat-
ing to execution of each Convention, and the provisions in the concluding procedural portion.
Id. at 169-70.
114. Roberts, supra note 113, at 172. Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed in hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-men-
tioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder all kinds, mu-
tilation, cruel treatment torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
Id.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties
to the conflict. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.AS. No.
3362, 75 UN.TS. 31-83.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 448. The inadequacies became apparent when States refused or were reluc-
tant to recognize an Article 3 situation. Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to
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was a problem determining when the Article was applicable.'" The
Article does not define the necessary level of hostilities required to
invoke its protections, other than a vague standard of "armed con-
flict not of an international character." This allows governments to
exhibit broad discretion in determining whether or not the Article
applies to the parties involved." 9
It has been suggested that the concept of an armed conflict en-
compasses "the idea of open, armed confrontation between relatively
organized armed forces or armed groups. Internal disturbances char-
acterized by sporadic acts of violence and internal tensions charac-
terized by widespread arrests are not considered armed conflicts."12
Nevertheless, it is the government that has the final word. This sug-
gests an additional problem with Common Article 3, lack of an en-
forcement mechanism. The nearest the Article comes to addressing
the enforcement issue is the provision that allows an impartial hu-
manitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to offer its services to the Parties of the conflict.121 Thus, an
examination of Common Article 3 reveals a general and incomplete
provision that cannot be considered a sufficient guide for parties in-
volved in an internal conflict.122
C. 1977 Geneva Protocol II
In 1964 the International Committee of the Red Cross recog-
nized problems and began drafting possible improvements to Com-
mon Article 3.123 The result was a draft protocol that provided addi-
tional laws relating to non-international armed conflicts that
eventually evolved into Geneva Protocol 11.2 ' First, the Geneva Pro-
tocol 11 establishes itself as a supplement to "Article 3 common to
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments,
33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 13-14 (1983). For example, the French government did not recognize
Article 3 until the late stages of the Algerian War while the British government has refused to
accept the Article during outbreaks of violence in Kenya and Cyprus in the 1950s. Id. at 14.
118. Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol I and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 14
(1983).
119. Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 29, 30
(1983).
120. Id.
121. Roberts, supra note 113, at 172. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, art.
3, 6 US.T 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
122. Roberts, supra note 113, at 447-48. The Articles do not provide a definitive codifi-
cation of the laws of war for internal conflicts. Id. at 448. Further, the provisions are general
and incomplete, and thus, they cannot be viewed as an adequate guide to parties involved in a
non-international armed conflict. Id. at 448.
123. Id. at 448. The question of non-international armed conflicts was addressed in Arti-
cle 19 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention which provides for the application of




the Geneva Convention of 1949 without modifying its existing condi-
tions of application." '125 Second, the Geneva Protocol II defines the
necessary armed conflict required to invoke its protections as
[any armed conflict] which take[s] place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed. forces or other organized armed groups which, under re-
sponsible command, exercise such control over a part of its terri-
tory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted mili-
tary operations and to implement this Protocol.'
These factors interact to define the scope of both Common Article 3
and the Geneva Protocol II in the following manner:
[I]n those situations in which the conditions for the applica-
tion of Protocol II are fulfilled, both Protocol II and Common
Article 3 apply simultaneously, because the scope of Protocol II
is included in the wider scope of Common Article 3. On the
other hand, in a low-intensity conflict, which does not fulfill the
conditions for the application of Protocol II, only Common Arti-
cle 3 applies.'27
Thus, in theory, the Geneva Protocol II clarifies and resolves
many of the problems associated with determining the applicable
laws of war in an internal conflict. A weakness, however, still exists
in distinguishing between armed conflicts and internal disturbances
at lower levels of violence. When determining the applicability of the
Protocol, this weakness reopens the door to discretionary government
abuse. 128
In terms of protections afforded in a non-international armed
conflict, the Geneva Protocol II represents a significant advance-
ment."'29 The Protocol broadens the scope of humane treatment, par-
ticularly in regard to children and persons whose liberty has been
restricted. 31 In addition, by requiring an independent and impartial
judicial hearing, the Protocol addresses the prosecution and punish-
ment of criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.' 31
Perhaps its greatest advancement is in the protections afforded
125. Id.
126. Id. at 449-50.
127. Junod, supra note 119, at 35.
128. Roberts, supra note 113, at 448. For example, the events in Tucuman Province in
northwest Argentina in the mid-1970s were typical of an armed conflict, but in Buenos Aires
which is 1000 miles away, they were generally considered an internal disturbances. Junod,
supra note 105, at 39.
129. However, although it represented an advancement, the final draft of Protocol If
was a significantly reduced version of the original draft that the International Committee of
the Red Cross had presented at the Diplomatic Conference. Lysaght, supra note 104, at 10.
130. Roberts, supra note 113, at 450-51. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609-99.
131. Id. at 453-54.
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to the civilian population.13 2 Article 13 of the Geneva Protocol 11
specifically states that civilian populations shall not be the object of
attack. 33 Also, of particular relevance to the Yugoslav situation, is
Article 17 of the Geneva Protocol 11.134 This Article 17 prohibits
forced movement of civilians by providing that civilian populations
shall be neither displaced nor compelled to leave their own territory
for reasons related to the conflict.135 This article may have an impact
in Croatia in areas where a Serbian minority exists.
The major weakness of the Geneva Protocol II, similar to many
other humanitarian laws, is the lack of an implementation and en-
forcement mechanism.1 36 Although the International Committee of
the Red Cross addressed the subject in its draft protocol, the Geneva
Protocol II has no provision for enforcement or even observance.
1 37
After all, the Geneva Protocol II was designed only to supplement
Common Article 3; therefore, the enforcement mechanism of the Ar-
ticle, an impartial humanitarian body that may offer its services to
the Parties in conflict, would appear applicable to the Protocol. 38
This lack of an effective enforcement mechanism is a weakness
shared not only by the Geneva Protocol, but also by the Geneva
Conventions in general.
1 39
D. International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was es-
tablished in 1 863 and became one of the first international bodies to
address the problems associated with internal conflicts.140 At the
Tenth International Red Cross Conference in 1921, a resolution was
adopted recognizing the role of the Red Cross in civil wars:
l.The Red Cross, transcending all political, social, religious, ra-
cial, class, and national competition, affirms its right and duty to
132. Lysaght, supra note 118, at 24.
133. Roberts, supra note 113, at 24.
134. Id. at 456.
135. Id.
136. Lysaght, supra note 118, at 25.
137. Id. The International Committee of the Red Cross suggested that the Protocol II
contain an enforcement provision which allowed a body offering all guarantees of impartiality
and efficacy to be called upon or to offer services to cooperate in the observance of the provi-
sion of the Protocol. Id. (citing INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS. DRAFT PROTOCOL ADDI-
TIONAL TO GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949 RELATING TO NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS, art. 39 (1949)).
138. Lysaght, supra note 118, at 25.
139. Id. at 27.
140. Veuthey, Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 83 (1983). For example, the ICRC maintained a delegate in the
Soviet Union during the Russian Revolution in 1918-1919. Id. at 84. See also A. DURAND,
HISTOIRE Du COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE: DE SARA-JEVO A HIROSHIMA
78-87 (1978); J. MOREILLON, LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CRox-ROUGE ET LA PRO-
TECTION DES DETENUS POLITIQUES 44-47 (1973).
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take actions to provide relief in civil war, social disturbances,
and revolutions. The Red Cross recognizes that all nations of
civil war or conflicts of the type mentioned are without excep-
tion entitled to assistance, pursuant to the General Articles of
the Red Cross.
2.An important role of the National Red Cross Society in any
country where civil war breaks out is to assist impartially the
victims. 4
Thus, in the event of civil war, the ICRC was mandated the role of
intervening with relief." 2
Only Article 3, however, is common to both the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and international humanitarian law." 3s It allows the
ICRC to "offer its services to the parties" of non-international con-
flicts. ""' Based on this limited legal footing, the ICRC has a right in
non-international conflicts to offer its services based upon its own
statutes and the statutes of the International Red Cross."45 Govern-
ments are free to accept or reject these offers.'"
In the event of an internal conflict, the ICRC begins by request-
ing that all parties abide by international humanitarian law princi-
ples.", 7 Based on paragraph 3 of Common Article 3, such requests
may also be complemented by special agreements between the par-
ties to the conflict." 8 Pursuant to this provision, the parties are al-
lowed "to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or
part of the other provisions" of the Geneva Conventions." 9 Further,
141. Id.
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id. at 83.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 87. ICRC statutes permit delegates:
I. to visit and interview prisoners of war and civilian internees without witnesses;
2. to provide relief to the population of occupied territories;
3. to search for missing persons and to forward family messages to prisoners of
war and civilians;
4. to offer its good offices to facilitate tie institution of hospital zones and locali-
ties and safety zones and localities; and
5. to receive applications from protected persons.
Id. at 87-88. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
August 12, 1949, arts. 123, 126, 6 US.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
143, 140, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12,
1949, arts. 23, 14, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.AS. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 92.
148. Veuthey, supra note 140, at 92. The most successful special agreements began with
the ICRC delegate collecting declarations from all the parties agreeing to abide by the princi-
ples or the provisions of the Conventions. Id. For example, in Yemen ICRC delegates received
a declaration of intent for the application of the provisions of the Conventions from the Royal-
ists, and the President of the Republic agreed also to abide by the Conventions. Id., (citing
INT't COMM. OF THE RED CRoss ANN. REP. 29 (1962)).
149. Id.
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since ICRC must remain impartial, its activities are limited to
"preventing and alleviating human suffering, protecting life and
health, and ensuring respect for human dignity, according to Red
Cross principles on humanity." 150 In addition, the Red Cross fur-
nishes food and medical assistance to the parties involved in the in-
ternal conflict.' 5 ' Finally, the Red Cross not only visits prisoners, but
also "[asks] for access to all places of detention, freedom to speak
privately with detainees, a list of detainees, authorization to provide
needy detainees and their relatives with material assistance," and
furnishes a report to the detaining authorities.' 52 In summation, al-
though the International Committee of the Red Cross acts only on a
limited legal basis, it plays a major role in supervising and imple-
menting humanitarian objectives in non-international armed
conflicts.
E. Yugoslavia and Laws of Non-International Armed Conflict
Before considering the applicability and observance of the laws
of war governing non-international conflicts in Yugoslavia, it is nec-
essary to understand the dilemma that confronts conflicting parties.
It is difficult to strike a balance between the necessities of combat
and the observance of the laws of war.15 3 First, application of the
rules appears to favor the government.'54 If the rules, therefore, were
respected from the outset of the resistance movement, the insurgents
may be deprived of a means of action.' 55 Second, the civilian popula-
tion plays an important role in an internal conflict. 56 Attempted se-
cessions, such as those by Croatia and Slovenia, have little chance of
success unless they are backed by the will of the civilian popula-
tion.1"7 In order to stop secession movements, it is often necessary to
defeat the secession army as well as the civilian population.' As a
result, humanitarian law is often sacrificed at the expense of the ci-
vilian population. Third, it is important that the secession movement
recognize the humanitarian principles, or it will become increasingly
difficult to apply these principles to persons who disregard them.'59
Thus, in the application of humanitarian rules, the very nature of a
150. Id.
151. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 102 (1969).
152. Id.
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non-international armed conflicts presents inherent problems. 180
With these problems in mind, it is necessary to examine the
standards enunciated under Common Article 3 and the Geneva Pro-
tocol II, to determine the applicability of the rules of war to the
internal conflict in Yugoslavia. Common Article 3 applies to any
armed conflict not of an international character."' In regard to an
internal crisis, this is the only guidance Common Article 3 provides.
Despite this limited instruction, it is evident that the Article should
be applied to the current Yugoslav crisis.
The concept of an armed conflict encompasses "the idea of
open, armed confrontation between relatively organized armed forces
or armed groups.' 1 62 In Yugoslavia, two organized armed groups,
the Serbs and the Croats, waged a war that resulted in approxi-
mately 10,000 deaths. 63 The fighting has been strictly limited within
the confines of Yugoslavia, chiefly Croatia.1'6  Thus, the Croatian,
Serbian, and Slovenion aspect of the Yugoslavian crisis is an armed
conflict of a non-international nature. As such, Common Article 3
pertains to both the Serbs and the Croats when invoking its basic
humanitarian protections.
The Geneva Protocol II, in addition to providing further human-
itarian protections to conflicting parties, provides a more explicit
standard for determining whether its protections should be extended
to a given crisis.' 65 This standard requires an armed conflict
which take[s] place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, ex-
ercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol. 6 '
This standard must be broken down, examined, and applied to the
Yugoslavian crisis.
First, Protocol II applies when government armed forces con-
front dissident forces. 6 7 It is "when the regular armed forces fight
against insurgents who have formed organized armed groups.' 6 8
160. Id.
161. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 114, at 172. See also Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces,
August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.IAS. No. 3362, 75 U-N.T.S. 31.
162. Junod, supra note 105, at 30.
163. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 2.
164. Id.
165. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 114, at 447-58.
166. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 114, at 449-550. Yugoslavia signed
the Geneva Protocol ii on December 12, 1977 and ratified the document on June 11, 1979,
thus, Yugoslavia became a High Contracting Party. Id. at 461.
167. Id. at 449.
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This aspect is satisfied because the Yugoslay army is fighting against
an organized Croatian army.
Second, the dissident armed forces must be under responsible
command.16 Responsible command implies that dissident armed
forces must be organized to some degree. 170 A de facto authority,
which is able "to plan and carry out concerted military operations
and to impose the discipline required," must exist. 71 This element is
satisfied because Croatia is under the command of President Franjo
Tudjman. 72 Under this leadership, Croatia withstood six months of
warfare with Serbia, evincing an organized armed force capable of
sustained military operations. Stemming from the repeated failures
of the various cease fires, there may be some doubt as to the disci-
pline aspect of this element. The mere negotiation of such cease fires
suggests, however, that Croatia does possess the necessary discipline
required.
Third, there must be control over territory. 73 This element is
easily met because Croatia continues to be in control of approxi-
mately two-thirds of the original territory that declared its indepen-
dence from Yugoslavia.1
7 4
The fourth element examines the extent of this control and
whether it is sufficient to enable the dissent party to carry out sus-
tained and concentrated military operations. 175 As previously dis-
cussed, it appears that Croatia is capable of sustaining the degree of
military action that this element requires. For example, Croatia
blockaded approximately forty Federal garrisons containing 25,000
National Army troops for six months.'76 In addition, although the
Croatians were defeated and lost the city of Vukovar to the Serbian-
led Yugoslav army, the defeat came after a three month battle and
siege. 77 These examples display the ability to carry out a sustained
military action.
Finally, the dissident must be capable of implementing the Pro-
tocol. 178 This suggests that "as soon as the material criteria [is] ful-
filled, it may be reasonably expected that the parties will apply the
rules of protection contained in the Protocol, because the parties
which two or more factions within a country confront one another without the involvement of
government armed forces. Id. at 36-37.
169. Id. at 37.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at 5, col. 2.
173. Roberts, supra note 113, at 449-58.
174. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 2.
175. Roberts, supra note 113, 449-50.
176. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at 5, col. 2.
177. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
178. Roberts, supra note 113, at 449-50.
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would then have an adequate infrastructure for such application. ' 179
The above analysis indicates that the Yugoslavian crisis almost cer-
tainly meets the material criteria.
Thus, it seems reasonably appropriate to expect the parties to
abide by the Protocol. Both Croatia and Serbia possess the adequate
infrastructure necessary to implement the Protocol."'0 An examina-
tion of Common Article 3 and the Geneva Protocol II reveals that
the Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia aspect of the Yugoslavian crisis
appears to meet the requirements necessary for invoking the humani-
tarian protections afforded by each document.
V. The International Law Approaches Toward Internal War
A. Traditional International Law Approach
Generally, international law is a body of rules governing the re-
lationships between States.1"1 An internal conflict, such as a civil
war, is frequently considered outside the scope of international
law.1 82 As a result, governments usually will not apply the customary
laws of war and justify such a refusal on the grounds that it is their
sovereign right as a nation to deal with domestic enemies.183 Since
international law will recognize the outcome of an internal conflict,
however, certain levels of conflict are accorded the rights and duties
of nations upon their achievement. 84
Traditional international law recognizes three categories "based
on the military and political success of the movement and the degree
to which it resembled a sovereign State." ' 5 The three classifications:
rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency are designed "to distinguish
among conflicts along a continuum of ascending intensity.
186
A rebellion is a minor internal conflict, such as a riot, an iso-
179. Junod, supra note 119, at 38.
180. Id.
181. H. WILSON. INTERNATIONAL LANDAND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERA-
TION MOVEMENTS 22 (1988).
182. Id. International law neither condones nor condemns revolution within an estab-
lished State. Id. Further, if a revolution succeeds, nothing in international law prohibits the
acceptance of the outcome despite the fact it may be obtained by force. Id. at 23. However,
nations still insist that only the rules to which they agree bind them and they rarely concede to
any international law limitations on how to deal with domestic enemies. J. BOND, supra note
95, at 49.
183. J. BOND, supra note 109, at 49-50. The doctrine of nations' rights is embedded in
the United Nations Charter which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter.
Id. at 49-50. See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
184. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 23.
185. Id.
186. R. FALK. LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 117 (1968).
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lated or sporadic act of violence, or an uprising that is rapidly sup-
pressed, such as a riot.187 Under international law, a rebellion within
the borders of a sovereign state falls within the exclusive domain of
that state.' 8 Further, international law neither grants rights nor im-
poses duties on a rebel party. 18 9 An internal conflict that is classified
as a rebellion, prohibits foreign states from assisting the rebels.19
However, aid to the incumbent government is permitted.' 9' In this
way, international law favors the incumbent government in a rebel-
lion and accords the rebel party no benefits or protections.
92
International acknowledgement of insurgency is the recognition
that an internal war exists.193 Each individual state controls the con-
sequences of its acknowledgements. 194 Insurgency is not precisely
characterized, but it is generally held to constitute a greater level of
ascending intensity than a rebellion. 195 To be recognized as insur-
gents, the rebels must have: "sufficient control over territory and suf-
ficient military might for the interests of foreign States to be af-
fected, giving rise to the necessity of some kind of relations with the
insurgents." 1 96 Essentially, an insurgency moves beyond a rebellion,
entails a degree of limited relations with foreign states, but does not
reach belligerency.
The rights and duties extended to insurgents are limited and do
not extend beyond the territory of the state involved in the internal
war.197 Nevertheless, an insurgent is often given extensive rights by
third party states and is expected to conform to the applicable rules
of international law. 198 There is an increasing tendency to apply the
laws of war to insurgents and to allow them to make arrangements
for humanitarian protection through the International Committee of
the Red Cross. 199
187. Id. at 118-19.
188. H. WILSON supra note 181, at 23.
189. Id. at 23-24. For example, rebels may be punished under municipal law, and thus,
there is no obligation to treat them as prisoners of war. Id. at 23.
190. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 118.
191. Id.
192. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 23.
193. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 119.
194. Id.
195. Id. As Sir Hersh Lauterpacht stated:
[Alny attempt to lay down conditions of recognition 'of insurgency leads
itself to misunderstanding. Recognition of insurgency creates a factual relation
in that legal rights and duties as between insurgents and outside states exist only
insofar as they expressly conceded and agreed upon for reasons of convenience,
of humanity or of economic interest.
H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 24. See also H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 267-77 (1947).
196. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 24.
197. Id. at 25. (citing I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 693 (1968)).
198. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 120. Third party states cannot treat an internal con-
flict as a rebellion once it has been identified as an insurgency by the parent government. Id.
199. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 25, (citing E. CASTREN, CIVIL WAR 117 (1966)).
[Vol. 10:2
YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WAR
Finally,. there is a split of authority over the recognition granted
the combatants. Some contend that insurgency entitles the combat-
ants to the status of "contestants-at-law," rather than mere law
breakers. 200 Others argue that such a status is conferred only when
the conflict reaches the level of belligerency.20 1 In conclusion, "the
status of insurgency is a flexible instrument for the formulation of
claims and tolerances by third states. 20 2 The requirements for bel-
ligerency are much more precisely defined:
[F]irst, there must exist within the State an armed conflict
of a general (as distinguished from a purely local) character;
second, the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial
portion of national territory; third, they must conduct the hostil-
ities in accordance with the rules of war and through organized
armed forces acting under a responsible authority; fourth, there
must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside




Despite the apparent clarity of this test, it is often uncertain when
recognition is necessary. As a result, the recognition of belligerency
has become largely discretionary.0 4
The recognition of belligerency essentially accords the insur-
gents status as a de facto state.20 5 This entitles them to the rights
and duties of a state under international law which include the hu-
manitarian laws of war.20 The recognition of belligerency differs,
however, from the recognition of a state because the former recog-
nizes only those rights that are immediately concerned with war.20 7
For example, the belligerent entity not only cannot negotiate trea-
ties, but it also must keep all discussion with third party states at an
200. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 25. See also C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES 203 (2d ed. 1947); R. HIGGINS. INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND CIVIL CONFLICT 170 (1972); M. GREENSPAN. THE MODERN LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 620 (1959).
201. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 25, (citing H. BRIGGS. THE LAW OF NATIONS:
CASES. DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 1000 (2d ed. 1953)); E. CASTREN, CIVIL WAR 97 (1966).
202. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 121. The status of insurgency presents trouble when
third party states use it to influence the outcome of an internal war. Id.
203. Id. at 124, (citing H. LAUTERPACHT. RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 176
(1947)).
204. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 26. When an objective determination based on the
belligerency test is difficult, attention may be paid to the conduct of the incumbent that dis-
closes a desire to negotiate with the insurgent elite on a level of equality. R. FALK, supra note
172, at 124. This may be viewed as evidence for third nations to treat a given internal war as
an instance of belligerency. Id.
205. J. BOND, supra note 109, at 51.
206. Id.
207. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 27.
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informal and unofficial level." ° Thus, while conferring a substantial
degree of rights and duties, belligerency is nonetheless restricted by
its discretionary nature and focus on the internal war.
These insurgence, belligerence, and rebellion standards must be
applied to the crisis involving Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia. First,
the crisis has definitely ascended beyond the rebellion level. The con-
flict is neither a riot nor an isolated act of violence.2 0 9 The crisis has
continued for a prolonged duration and has resulted in approxi-
mately 10,000 deaths. 1 An insurgency standard requires sufficient
control over territory and sufficient military strength to affect the
interests of foreign states.' It appears that the situation has satis-
fied this requirement as well. Croatia still controls two-thirds of the
original land that seceded from Yugoslavia. 22
In addition, Croatia has sufficient strength to affect the interests
of foreign states as third parties. This is evidenced by the European
Community's numerous attempts to negotiate a cease fire with Ser-
bia.213 These attempts are indicative of the conflict's influence on
foreign states. Thus, it appears that the intensity of the Croatia, Slo-
venia, and Serbia aspect of the Yugoslavian crisis has, at a mini-
mum, ascended to the level of an insurgence, and as such, is entitled
to the various rights attainment of this status affords.
The issue of whether the Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbian aspect
of Yugoslavian crisis has reached the status of belligerence presents
a much more difficult question. First, belligerency requires that a
general armed conflict exists within the State.2"4 This element ap-
pears to be satisfied because the situation is not simply a local ac-
tion, but rather a civil war erupting due to Croatia's declaration of
independence."' Second, the insurgents must occupy and administer
a substantial portion of national territory.21 " This element is also met
because Croatia occupies and controls two-thirds of the original ter-
208. Id. See also LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (7th ed.
1923). As Mr. Anthony Eden, a British Foreign Secretary stated:
Recognition of belligerency is, of course, quite distinct for recognizing any
one to whom you give that right as being the legitimate Government of the
Country. It has nothing to do with it. It is a conception simply concerned with
granting rights of belligerency which are of convenience to the donor as much as
they are to the recipients.
H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 27, (citing STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 147 (5th ed. 1963)).
209. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 119.
210. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 2.
211. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 24.
212. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 2.
213. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
214. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
215. Walsh, supra note 84, at 38.
216. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
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ritory that sought independence from Serbia.2"7 Third, the insurgents
must conduct the hostilities in accordance with the laws of war and
have organized armed forces that act under a responsible author-
ity.21 8 In light of potential violations of the laws of war, this element
presents a difficult hurdle for Croatia to overcome. Despite the Janu-
ary 3, 1992 cease fire, it is extremely difficult to make an accurate
determination of compliance with the laws of war. For example, both
sides are guilty of violating previous cease fires. 219 It generally ap-
pears, however, that the rules have been followed.
Finally, there must exist circumstances that require outside
States to define their position or attitude by means of recognizing
belligerence.22° Immediately following Croatia's declaration of inde-
pendence, the Western- nations, including the United States, made it
clear that Croatia was not recognized as an independent state. 22' De-
spite this, on January 16, 1992, the twelve nations of the European
Community officially recognized Croatia and Slovenia.222 In addi-
tion, the United States recognized the independence of two republics
as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.223 Thus, ac-
cording to the requirements of belligerence, it appears that the Croa-
tia, Slovenia, and Serbia aspect of the Yugoslav crisis may have
reached the necessary level of intensity. Nevertheless, if a conflict
such as this has not reached the required level, it is difficult to imag-
ine a real-world conflict that would actually qualify for belligerency
status.
B. New International Law Approach Towards Civil War
The classification of internal war as rebellious, insurgent, and
belligerent has created several problems that have largely rendered it
virtually useless in the modern world. First, nations have avoided ex-
press declarations of status to the parties involved in an internal
war.224 Recognition of belligerence has not occurred since before
World War 11.225 Thus, this categorization scheme is more the crea-
tion of academic and theoretical commentators than a workable sys-
217. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 2.
218. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
219. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
220. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
221. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1991, a 6, cols. 1-4.
222. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1, col. 1. Several other countries also recognized
Croatia and Slovenia including Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the
Vatican. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 10, col. 6.
223. N.Y. Times, April 8, at 10, col. 3.
224. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
225. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 27. See also LUARD. CIVIL CONFLICTS IN MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (1972). In the Spanish Civil War the insurgents were not even
recognized as belligerents. H. WILSON, supra note 181, at 27.
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tem suitable for actual state behavior. 26 Second, despite the classifi-
cation of internal war, it is difficult to standardize what is permitted
and what is forbidden in terms of identifying an actual violation. 27
Third, it has become increasingly difficult for foreign states to main-
tain impartiality. 28 The decline of mutuality has only increased the
difficulty of non-intervention in any type of internal conflict.2 2 9
Thus, there has been an increasing tendency to develop a new
international law for civil war. This trend calls for a reformulation of
the international law "in a manner that is more responsive to the
specific contexts within which critical choices are now being made by
governments."23 International law should seek to influence these
choices by promoting mutually beneficial world-order policies.
2 31
Generally, this new outlook seeks to classify the civil war situation;
to classify claims made by governments and others in relation to civil
war situations; and to recommend policy prescriptions that allow
limited intervention for limited ends under specific circumstances
232
This new viewpoint attempts to promote intervention based on "com-
promise, moderation and mutual acceptance of limits," as opposed to
total restrain and prohibition. 3 a This concept recognizes that the
success of a regulatory enterprise in modern international law rests
on its ability to satisfy the interests of the principal governments as
viewed by their heads-of-state.234 Such an approach seeks to en-
courage an interaction of claims and counterclaims amongst conflict-
ing parties .2 3 This results in a legislative process for the field of in-
ternational law in relation to civil war.2 6
Such a flexible approach would first seek to classify the situa-
tion in Yugoslavia. Under the classification scheme, a war of separa-
tion currently exists in Yugoslavia. 237 A war of separation occurs
when "Government A is opposed by Countergovernment B, which
seeks to establish a new State, Y, in addition to State X."123 s This
type of war is common in states that attempt to impose "homogene-
ous standards upon a heterogeneous social, ethnic, and political tra-
226. R. FALK, supra note 186, at 124.
227. Id. at 25.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. INTERNATIONAL supra note 108, at 17 (1971).
231. Id.
232. Id. See also Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign
Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARv. L. REV. 511 (1969); Farer, Intervention in Civil Wars:
A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1967); Friedman, Intervention, Civil War and
International War, 59 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 67-75 (1965).
233. INTERNATIONAL, supra note 108, at 17.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 18.





dition. 12 3 9 This describes the Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia aspect of
the Yugoslavia, crisis.
With this classification established, it becomes necessary to clas-
sify various governmental claims and recommend policy prescrip-
tions for possible limited intervention. 240 It is at this stage that
problems have developed because the only agreed-upon objective is
peace. Evidenced by repeated cease fire violations, it is uncertain
whether either Croatia or Serbia are even interested in peace. Fur-
thermore, differing opinions in regard to enforcing a cease fire have
contributed to the difficulty in formulating a cohesive policy among
the various parties. Initially, the cease fire was to be policed through
self-enforcement by both Croatia and Serbia.241 This was followed
by an external enforcement by European Community observers. 42
Finally, it appears that a United nations peacekeeping force com-
posed of 14,000 members which began deployment on April 5, 1992,
will attempt to monitor the latest cease fire.24
The failure of the fourteen previous cease fires indicates the dif-
ficulty in enforcing and maintaining such a resolution." ' Such a fail-
ure to establish a mutually acceptable policy has contributed to the
current pattern of cease fires followed by repeated outbreaks of hos-
tilities. This pattern, however, may finally come to an end once the
United Nations peacekeeping force is completely deployed.2" 5 Thus,
it appears that this new international law approach may have some
merit for application to the Yugoslavian crisis.
Nevertheless, all the parties involved have ignored the funda-
mental underpinnings of this new approach-establishment of a type
of legislative interaction that will result in an intermediate position
between rules of prohibition and rules of discretion.246 As a conse-
quence, a successful compromise has not been found nor will it be
found until the elements of the approach are advocated and followed.
The Yugoslavian crisis presents an ideal situation for the new inter-
national approach because the civil war is easily classified by it. Ad-
ditionally, distinct categories of legal problems raised by the crisis
must be isolated and dealt with both in regard to third party inter-
vention as well as to the conduct prescribed by the laws of war.24 7
239. Id. at 17.
240. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1991, at 5, cols. 1-5.
24I. Id.
242: N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
243. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1992, at 10, col. 3.
244. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 10, col. 4.
245. N.Y .Times, March 24, 1992, at 10, col. 3.
246. R. FALK, supra note 230, at 17.
247. Id. at 28.
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VI. Conclusion
A major crisis exists in Yugoslavia. The source of the conflict
can be traced back hundreds of years to the first arrivals of the
Southern Slavs in the Balkan region. Historical development sepa-
rated the Serbs and Croats, and each matured under different cul-
tures and traditions. Following the First World War, the Southern
Slavs united under a wave of nationalism to form the first modern
Yugoslavian state. However, the differences between the Serbs and
Croats could not be swept aside, as they had evolved over the course
of hundreds of years. A united Yugoslavia on paper was far different
from the reality of the situation. Paper alone cannot erase the deep-
rooted differences of the Croats and Serbs.
These differences erupted on June 25, 1991, with the succession
of Croatia and Slovenia. With Serbia attempting to quash the inde-
pendence movement, hostilities immediately erupted. The fighting
has ceased in Slovenia and a fragile cease fire has been in effect in
Croatia since January 3, 1992. However, fighting is capable of flar-
ing up at any time, as previous cease fires have broken down.
It has been only recently that laws of war have been developed
to govern a situation such as the one that exists in Yugoslavia.
Under these rules, two situations are deemed sufficient to invoke the
protections offered by the rules of law governing warfare. First, it
appears that the Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia aspect of Yugoslavian
crisis meets the necessary prerequisites to invoke the humanitarian.
protections offered by Common Article 3 and Geneva Protocol II.
Second, the conflict has at least reached the state of insurgence and
possibly belligerency. As such, the crisis is entitled to all the benefits
attainment of each status affords.
These classification schemes have created numerous problems
and are rapidly becoming obsolete in the reality of the modern
world. As a result, a new international law approach towards civil
war has developed. This new approach seeks to classify the civil war
and address the conflict within this specific context. Based on this
foundation, the approach promotes the establishment of legislative
interaction' between the opposing states with the goal of reaching a
successful intermediate position between the factions. This new ap-
proach is ideally suited for the crisis that has reduced the unified six-
republic nation of Yugoslavia into five spearate entities. The parties,
however, have failed to classify the civil war and address the issues
within the proper context of this classification. Further, neither side
has been willing to interact in a legislative fashion with the goal of
reaching a solution. But hope exists as the United Nations
peacekeeping force may provide the necessary stability for this legis-
lative interaction to occur and be successful. The crisis, however, will
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not end until both Croatia and Serbia are ready to make concessions
to reach the elusive goal of peace.
Charles Lewis Nier III

